Architecture
How Hedera, Ledger, and ENS form the three layers of the Bound stack.
Three-Layer Stack
Bound integrates three technologies, each serving a distinct layer:
| Layer | Technology | Role |
|---|---|---|
| Settlement | Hedera | Smart contracts, HCS event logging, agent payments |
| Containment | Ledger | Hardware co-signing, agent-independent constraints |
| Identity | ENS | Agent naming, certificate discovery, fleet management |
Hedera — Settlement and Infrastructure
CCP contracts are deployed on Hedera's EVM-compatible layer. Hedera provides:
- 10,000+ TPS with 3-second finality — fast enough for agent-speed transactions
- Sub-cent fees priced in USD — predictable costs for certificate operations
- HCS (Hedera Consensus Service) — timestamped, immutable event log for certificate lifecycle events (publish, revoke, attest, challenge)
- Mirror Node — historical queries for audit trails and monitoring
- aBFT consensus — byzantine fault tolerant security
Why Hedera for Bound
Bound's containment certificates need to be queried at machine speed. When Agent B receives a payment request from Agent A, it must verify the certificate in milliseconds. Hedera's 3s finality and native view call performance make real-time verification practical.
HCS provides the audit trail layer — every certificate publication, attestation, transaction, and challenge is logged with consensus timestamps. This is not just event logging; it's a provable chain of custody for the containment lifecycle.
Ledger — Containment Enforcement
The Ledger hardware device serves as the agent-independent constraint — the containment layer that the agent cannot influence, persuade, or circumvent.
How It Works
The SpendingLimit contract enforces a dual-signature model:
Below $5,000: Agent signs alone (autonomous operation)
Above $5,000: Agent + Ledger must both sign (human-in-the-loop)
Any amount: Smart contract enforces absolute periodic limit ($50k/day)The operator's Ledger device:
- Co-signs transactions above the cosign threshold via Clear Signing
- Signs certificates at publication time (hardware-attested operator identity)
- Cannot be social-engineered by the agent — it's a physical device outside the agent's causal reach
Why Ledger for Bound
Bound's thesis distinguishes agent-independent from agent-influenceable containment. The strongest form of agent-independent containment is hardware enforcement. An LLM agent can social-engineer a human operator, but it cannot social-engineer a hardware security module.
The Ledger's Clear Signing displays exactly what the operator is approving:
- Certificate publication: agent address, class, containment bound, expiry
- Transaction co-sign: recipient, amount, period spent vs. limit
- Attestation: certificate hash, class, stake amount
Parameter Changes
Only the Ledger-derived address can modify SpendingLimit parameters (maxSingleAction, maxPeriodicLoss, cosignThreshold). The agent cannot change its own limits — this is what makes the constraint agent-independent.
ENS — Identity and Discovery
ENS provides the human-readable identity layer for the CCP ecosystem.
Agent Identity
Instead of raw addresses, agents are identified by ENS names:
alpha.operator.eth → 0x89cFD052... (agent address)Certificate Discovery via Text Records
CCP-specific ENS text records enable cross-chain discovery:
| Key | Example | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
ccp.certificate | 0xfde667a0... | Active certificate hash |
ccp.class | C2 | Certificate class |
ccp.bound | 50000 | Containment bound (USDC) |
ccp.chain | 296 | Chain ID (Hedera testnet) |
ccp.registry | 0x776CAbA2... | Registry contract address |
ccp.role | agent / operator / auditor | Ecosystem role |
Verification Flow
A counterparty discovering an agent starts from the ENS name:
- Resolve
alpha.operator.eth→ agent address - Read
ccp.certificatetext record → certificate hash - Read
ccp.chain→ 296 (Hedera testnet) - Query
CCPRegistry.isValid(certHash)on Hedera → true - Query reserve, auditor stake, certificate class
- Accept or reject
Fleet Management
Operators register subnames for each agent in their fleet:
operator.eth ← operator identity
alpha.operator.eth ← agent 1 (trading bot)
beta.operator.eth ← agent 2 (payment agent)
gamma.operator.eth ← agent 3 (data buyer)Each subname carries its own CCP text records. Verifiers can enumerate an operator's entire fleet through ENS.
Auditor Identity
Auditors are also identified via ENS with reputation metadata:
| Key | Value |
|---|---|
ccp.role | auditor |
ccp.specialization | smart_contract_verification |
ccp.attestation_count | 47 |
ccp.challenge_count | 0 |
Data Flow
1. Operator deploys containment (Hedera EVM)
2. Auditor verifies + stakes + attests (Hedera EVM + HCS)
3. Operator publishes certificate (Ledger signs + Hedera EVM + HCS)
4. Operator sets ENS text records (Ethereum/Sepolia)
5. Agent transacts via SpendingLimit (Hedera EVM)
- Below threshold: agent-only
- Above threshold: Ledger co-signs
6. Counterparty resolves ENS → queries Hedera → verifies → accepts
7. All events logged to HCS → queryable via Mirror Node