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Architecture

How Hedera, Ledger, and ENS form the three layers of the Bound stack.

Three-Layer Stack

Bound integrates three technologies, each serving a distinct layer:

LayerTechnologyRole
SettlementHederaSmart contracts, HCS event logging, agent payments
ContainmentLedgerHardware co-signing, agent-independent constraints
IdentityENSAgent naming, certificate discovery, fleet management

Hedera — Settlement and Infrastructure

CCP contracts are deployed on Hedera's EVM-compatible layer. Hedera provides:

  • 10,000+ TPS with 3-second finality — fast enough for agent-speed transactions
  • Sub-cent fees priced in USD — predictable costs for certificate operations
  • HCS (Hedera Consensus Service) — timestamped, immutable event log for certificate lifecycle events (publish, revoke, attest, challenge)
  • Mirror Node — historical queries for audit trails and monitoring
  • aBFT consensus — byzantine fault tolerant security

Why Hedera for Bound

Bound's containment certificates need to be queried at machine speed. When Agent B receives a payment request from Agent A, it must verify the certificate in milliseconds. Hedera's 3s finality and native view call performance make real-time verification practical.

HCS provides the audit trail layer — every certificate publication, attestation, transaction, and challenge is logged with consensus timestamps. This is not just event logging; it's a provable chain of custody for the containment lifecycle.

Ledger — Containment Enforcement

The Ledger hardware device serves as the agent-independent constraint — the containment layer that the agent cannot influence, persuade, or circumvent.

How It Works

The SpendingLimit contract enforces a dual-signature model:

Below $5,000:  Agent signs alone (autonomous operation)
Above $5,000:  Agent + Ledger must both sign (human-in-the-loop)
Any amount:    Smart contract enforces absolute periodic limit ($50k/day)

The operator's Ledger device:

  1. Co-signs transactions above the cosign threshold via Clear Signing
  2. Signs certificates at publication time (hardware-attested operator identity)
  3. Cannot be social-engineered by the agent — it's a physical device outside the agent's causal reach

Why Ledger for Bound

Bound's thesis distinguishes agent-independent from agent-influenceable containment. The strongest form of agent-independent containment is hardware enforcement. An LLM agent can social-engineer a human operator, but it cannot social-engineer a hardware security module.

The Ledger's Clear Signing displays exactly what the operator is approving:

  • Certificate publication: agent address, class, containment bound, expiry
  • Transaction co-sign: recipient, amount, period spent vs. limit
  • Attestation: certificate hash, class, stake amount

Parameter Changes

Only the Ledger-derived address can modify SpendingLimit parameters (maxSingleAction, maxPeriodicLoss, cosignThreshold). The agent cannot change its own limits — this is what makes the constraint agent-independent.

ENS — Identity and Discovery

ENS provides the human-readable identity layer for the CCP ecosystem.

Agent Identity

Instead of raw addresses, agents are identified by ENS names:

alpha.operator.eth  →  0x89cFD052...  (agent address)

Certificate Discovery via Text Records

CCP-specific ENS text records enable cross-chain discovery:

KeyExamplePurpose
ccp.certificate0xfde667a0...Active certificate hash
ccp.classC2Certificate class
ccp.bound50000Containment bound (USDC)
ccp.chain296Chain ID (Hedera testnet)
ccp.registry0x776CAbA2...Registry contract address
ccp.roleagent / operator / auditorEcosystem role

Verification Flow

A counterparty discovering an agent starts from the ENS name:

  1. Resolve alpha.operator.eth → agent address
  2. Read ccp.certificate text record → certificate hash
  3. Read ccp.chain → 296 (Hedera testnet)
  4. Query CCPRegistry.isValid(certHash) on Hedera → true
  5. Query reserve, auditor stake, certificate class
  6. Accept or reject

Fleet Management

Operators register subnames for each agent in their fleet:

operator.eth           ← operator identity
  alpha.operator.eth   ← agent 1 (trading bot)
  beta.operator.eth    ← agent 2 (payment agent)
  gamma.operator.eth   ← agent 3 (data buyer)

Each subname carries its own CCP text records. Verifiers can enumerate an operator's entire fleet through ENS.

Auditor Identity

Auditors are also identified via ENS with reputation metadata:

KeyValue
ccp.roleauditor
ccp.specializationsmart_contract_verification
ccp.attestation_count47
ccp.challenge_count0

Data Flow

1. Operator deploys containment (Hedera EVM)
2. Auditor verifies + stakes + attests (Hedera EVM + HCS)
3. Operator publishes certificate (Ledger signs + Hedera EVM + HCS)
4. Operator sets ENS text records (Ethereum/Sepolia)
5. Agent transacts via SpendingLimit (Hedera EVM)
   - Below threshold: agent-only
   - Above threshold: Ledger co-signs
6. Counterparty resolves ENS → queries Hedera → verifies → accepts
7. All events logged to HCS → queryable via Mirror Node

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