Constraint Types
All constraint types recognized by Bound, their enforcement mechanisms, and agent-independence classification.
Constraint Types
Constraints are the building blocks of containment. Each constraint in a certificate describes one layer of protection.
Overview
| Type | Agent-Independent? | Enforcement | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
SPENDING_LIMIT | Yes | Smart Contract | Maximum value transferable per period |
PERMISSION_BOUNDARY | Depends | Smart Contract / Off-chain | Actions the agent is prohibited from taking |
EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT | Yes | TEE / HSM | Trusted execution environment isolation |
TIME_LOCK | Yes | Smart Contract | Delay between initiation and execution |
MULTI_SIG | Yes | Smart Contract | Multiple signatures required above threshold |
KILL_SWITCH | Depends | Smart Contract / Manual | Mechanism to halt agent operations |
REVERSIBILITY_WINDOW | Yes | Smart Contract | Time window during which transactions can be reversed |
SPENDING_LIMIT
The most common constraint type. Enforces maximum economic exposure per time period.
On-chain representation: SpendingLimit.sol contract with three parameters:
maxSingleAction— absolute cap per transaction (not bypassable, even with co-signature)maxPeriodicLoss— rolling cap per period (e.g., $50,000/day)cosignThreshold— crossover point requiring Ledger co-signature
Agent-independent? Yes — the smart contract enforces limits regardless of agent behavior. The agent cannot modify parameters; only the Ledger holder can.
CCP deployment: 50k periodic, $5k cosign threshold, 24-hour period.
PERMISSION_BOUNDARY
Restricts which actions the agent can take (e.g., which contracts it can call, which functions it can invoke).
Agent-independent? Depends on enforcement:
- Smart contract allowlists: Yes
- Off-chain permission checks: No (agent may social-engineer humans to change permissions)
EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT
The agent runs inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Hardware Security Module (HSM), or Multi-Party Computation (MPC) setup.
Agent-independent? Yes — TEE attestation reports prove code integrity, and the agent cannot modify its own execution environment from within.
Audit scope: Verify attestation report, check code measurement hash, confirm configuration.
TIME_LOCK
High-value actions require a delay between initiation and execution, giving operators or monitoring systems time to intervene.
Agent-independent? Yes — the delay is enforced at the smart contract level.
MULTI_SIG
Actions above a threshold require signatures from multiple parties (e.g., agent + Ledger, or agent + 2 of 3 operators).
Agent-independent? Yes — the signature requirement is cryptographic and enforced on-chain.
CCP deployment: Ledger HSM co-signs all transactions above the $5,000 cosign threshold.
KILL_SWITCH
A mechanism to immediately halt all agent operations.
Agent-independent? Depends:
- Smart contract pause (operator-only): Yes (if operator key is agent-independent, e.g., Ledger)
- Manual monitoring + human intervention: No
REVERSIBILITY_WINDOW
Transactions can be reversed within a defined time window after execution.
Agent-independent? Yes — the reversal mechanism is enforced by the smart contract. The agent cannot accelerate or skip the window.
Classification Rules
A constraint is agent_independent: true if and only if:
- The enforcement mechanism cannot be influenced by agent outputs
- The agent cannot modify, bypass, or weaken the constraint through any channel
- The constraint would hold even if the agent were adversarially optimizing against it
Only agent-independent constraints contribute to the certificate's containment bound.