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Protocol

Constraint Types

All constraint types recognized by Bound, their enforcement mechanisms, and agent-independence classification.

Constraint Types

Constraints are the building blocks of containment. Each constraint in a certificate describes one layer of protection.

Overview

TypeAgent-Independent?EnforcementDescription
SPENDING_LIMITYesSmart ContractMaximum value transferable per period
PERMISSION_BOUNDARYDependsSmart Contract / Off-chainActions the agent is prohibited from taking
EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENTYesTEE / HSMTrusted execution environment isolation
TIME_LOCKYesSmart ContractDelay between initiation and execution
MULTI_SIGYesSmart ContractMultiple signatures required above threshold
KILL_SWITCHDependsSmart Contract / ManualMechanism to halt agent operations
REVERSIBILITY_WINDOWYesSmart ContractTime window during which transactions can be reversed

SPENDING_LIMIT

The most common constraint type. Enforces maximum economic exposure per time period.

On-chain representation: SpendingLimit.sol contract with three parameters:

  • maxSingleAction — absolute cap per transaction (not bypassable, even with co-signature)
  • maxPeriodicLoss — rolling cap per period (e.g., $50,000/day)
  • cosignThreshold — crossover point requiring Ledger co-signature

Agent-independent? Yes — the smart contract enforces limits regardless of agent behavior. The agent cannot modify parameters; only the Ledger holder can.

CCP deployment: 10ksingleaction,10k single action, 50k periodic, $5k cosign threshold, 24-hour period.

PERMISSION_BOUNDARY

Restricts which actions the agent can take (e.g., which contracts it can call, which functions it can invoke).

Agent-independent? Depends on enforcement:

  • Smart contract allowlists: Yes
  • Off-chain permission checks: No (agent may social-engineer humans to change permissions)

EXECUTION_ENVIRONMENT

The agent runs inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), Hardware Security Module (HSM), or Multi-Party Computation (MPC) setup.

Agent-independent? Yes — TEE attestation reports prove code integrity, and the agent cannot modify its own execution environment from within.

Audit scope: Verify attestation report, check code measurement hash, confirm configuration.

TIME_LOCK

High-value actions require a delay between initiation and execution, giving operators or monitoring systems time to intervene.

Agent-independent? Yes — the delay is enforced at the smart contract level.

MULTI_SIG

Actions above a threshold require signatures from multiple parties (e.g., agent + Ledger, or agent + 2 of 3 operators).

Agent-independent? Yes — the signature requirement is cryptographic and enforced on-chain.

CCP deployment: Ledger HSM co-signs all transactions above the $5,000 cosign threshold.

KILL_SWITCH

A mechanism to immediately halt all agent operations.

Agent-independent? Depends:

  • Smart contract pause (operator-only): Yes (if operator key is agent-independent, e.g., Ledger)
  • Manual monitoring + human intervention: No

REVERSIBILITY_WINDOW

Transactions can be reversed within a defined time window after execution.

Agent-independent? Yes — the reversal mechanism is enforced by the smart contract. The agent cannot accelerate or skip the window.

Classification Rules

A constraint is agent_independent: true if and only if:

  1. The enforcement mechanism cannot be influenced by agent outputs
  2. The agent cannot modify, bypass, or weaken the constraint through any channel
  3. The constraint would hold even if the agent were adversarially optimizing against it

Only agent-independent constraints contribute to the certificate's containment bound.

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